case facts

The case facts in the case of "Commonwealth of Virginia v. Travis Eugene Williams (case number CR04-558-01 through CR04-563-01)" are outlined as follows. Travis will be referred to as the "defendant" throughout these case facts.
 

Statement Of Case
 

1. On January 20, 2004, the defendant was charged with one count of breaking and entering, two counts of robbery, two counts of abduction, four counts of use of a firearm, and one count of discharging a firearm into an occupied building.

2. On June 14, 2004, two counts of use of firearm, and two counts of abduction were nolle prossed in the Petersburg General District Court, the court appointed the defendant’s counsel, and the remaining six (6) felony charges were forwarded to the circuit court for trial.
 

3. Defendant was assigned a court appointed attorney: Phillip T. DiStanislao, Jr., Esquire of 800 South Sycamore Street, Petersburg, Virginia 23804. The Commonwealth's attorney for the case: Cheryl Wilson, Esquire of 150 North Sycamore Street, Petersburg, Virginia 23103. Judge: James F. D'Alton, Jr. On September 13, 2004, the initial jury trial resulted in mistrial. A new trial was set for November 16, 2004. On November 16, 2004 at defendant's second jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of one count of breaking and entering in violation of Virginia code 18.2-90, two counts of robbery in violation of Virginia code 18.2-58, two counts of use of a firearm in violation of Virginia code 18.2-53.1, and one count of discharging a firearm into an occupied building in violation of Virginia code 18.2-279. Case numbers CR04-558-01 through CR04-563-01. Sentencing was set for February 16, 2005.
 

4. On February 16, 2005, the defendant was sentenced to 20 years for the breaking and entering, 5 years for each robbery, 3 years for the first count of using a firearm, 5 years for the second count of using a firearm, and a $2,500 dollar fine for shooting into an occupied building. The total sentence: 38 consecutive years in the Virginia DOC.
 

5. On March 15, 2005, trial counsel for the defendant filed for leave of withdraw, and new counsel was appointed to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel for appeal: Elbert D. Mumphery, IV of 20 East Tabb Street, Suite 201, Petersburg, Virginia 23803.
 

6. The defendant's appeal was denied in both the Virginia Court of Appeals, and the Virginia Supreme Court without an evidentiary hearing.
 

7. Defendant sought heabeas corpus relief, pro se, and was denied on both the State and Federal level without an evidentiary hearing.
 

Statement Of Facts
 

8. On January 19, 2004, a local Hardee's restaurant in the city of Petersburg on south crater road was robbed in the night time. At the time of the robbery, (3) employees were in the establishment. Two of the employees were in the office during the actual robbery, while the third employee hid in the restroom. Money was demanded and taken only from the Hardees safe, and some property was damaged as a result of gunfire to gain entry. No employee was physically harmed, nor subjected to financial loss as the perp fled the scene.

9. The defendant was only 19 years old at the time of the offense, suffered from multiple mental disorders under the Americans with Disabilities Act since his childhood, and became a suspect due to his cell phone being found at the crime scene. 

10. The defendant voluntarily went to the local police department, submitted to questioning, and forensic testing for gunpowder, took detectives to his home for inspection, where he voluntarily gave the detectives clothing items of interest as the defendant fully denied any knowledge of, or involvement in the robbery. Detective Liverman and Detective Harris presided. At this time, the defendant was not under arrest and was allowed to leave. November 16, 2004, trial transcript, page 4, line 13-19. 

11. The defendant was later arrested from his job at Wendy's on Crater Road in Petersburg by a Det. Liverman of the Petersburg police, interrogated, and coerced. After the coercion, the detective stepped out of the interrogation room and deleted approximately 30 minutes of video footage (the 30 minutes confirming coercion) from what turned out to be Commonwealth's video confession and evidence against the defendant. Commonwealth's exhibit-6. The defendant was then charged with ten felonies and scheduled to appear before the court. At the defendant's preliminary hearing, four (4) charges were nolle prossed. Defendant was assigned a court appointed attorney and cases CR04-558-01 through CR04-563-01 were scheduled for trial.

12. Defendant informed his court appointed attorney of the coercion and deleted footage. Defendant was adamant about the fact of coercion and made it clear that if the entire video confession, to include the deleted footage confirming the alleged coercion, could not be played for the finders of fact, then none of the video confession should be shown. November 16, 2004, trial transcript, pg. 11, line 9 - 13. This was strictly to maintain the fundamental fairness of the trial proceeding by allowing the finders of fact to not only review the confession, but also the alleged coercion concealed by deleted footage.
 

13. The first jury trial on September 13, 2004, ended as a mistrial. November 16, 2004, trial transcript, pg 3, line 1 - line 3. At the second jury trial on November 16th, 2004, defendant was found guilty of six (6) felony offenses and later sentenced to 38 consecutive years in state prison without parole and a $2,500 dollar fine.
 

14. As the November 16th trial began the court appointed attorney for the defendant addressed the defendant's claims of coercion and missing footage. November 16, 2004, trial transcript, pg 3, line 9 - pg. 4, line 10. Following the defense’s claims of coercion and deleted footage in the videotaped confession of which was the prosecution’s case in chief, the Commonwealth’s attorney intentionally misled the court regarding the missing footage and declared it a redaction to exclude statements made by the defendant about other crimes. This created confusion, yet some clarity was established by highlighting that there were (2) videotape recordings. Once on the 19th of January 2004, which is referred to as the denial; and the second one from the 20th of January 2004, which is where the alleged coercion took place, where approximately 30 minutes of footage is missing, and is referred to as “redacted”. The second tape “redacted”, was the prosecution’s case in chief and the Commonwealth’s attorney made clear her intentions to play it. November 16, 2004, trial transcript, page 4, line 11- page 11, line 21. 

15. The court ruled to leave the “redacted” tape out along with the “denial” tape, due to its missing parts. November 16, 2004, trial transcript, page 13, line 18 - page 14, line 2.

16. The defense counsel informed the court that he disagreed with defendant’s wishes (i.e., to have the whole redacted videotaped confession played, to include the missing footage confirming coercion, or not to play any of the redacted videotaped confession at all). November 16, 2004, trial transcript, page 11, line 3-line 21.

17. The commonwealth’s attorney played the “redacted” videotape confession, minus the deleted footage confirming coercion, for the jury and introduced it into evidence as Commonwealth’s exhibit-6 with no objection from the defense counsel, nor intervention by the court. November 16, 2004, trial transcript, page 114, line 21-page 116, line 15.  

18. At the November 16th trial during the cross examination of Det. Liverman, Liverman initially denied responsibility for the deleted footage from the video confession, yet later admitted to being responsible for the deleted footage. November 16, 2004, trial transcript, pg. 117, line 24 - pg. 120, line 4.

19. At the deliberation phase of the November 16th trial the Commonwealth's attorney introduced a list of prior convictions known as instruction 13-A with the jury instructions as evidence of moral turpitude. November 16, 2004, trial transcript, pg. 172, line 23 - pg. 173, line 1. This list of prior convictions known as instruction 13-A included several fraudulent felony and misdemeanor convictions of which the court appointed attorney for the defendant signed off on without confirming the validity of the convictions listed therein.
 

20. At the close of the November 16th trial the court appointed attorney for defendant motioned to strike the Commonwealth's case stating that "the jury's verdict is contrary to the law and evidence that was presented”, yet the court overruled. The honorable judge James F. D'Alton, Jr. presided. November 16, 2004, trial transcript, pg. 211, line 1-20.
 

21. Upon a guilty verdict on all six felony counts, the court ordered a full pre-sentence report considering the nature of the offense. November 16, 2004, trial transcript, page 212, line 1–6. A long-form pre-sentence was ordered by the courts to be completed within 60 days.

22. On February 16, 2005, the defendant was sentenced to 38 consecutive years with a $2,500 dollar fine without parole and no time suspended. This too was without full review of mitigating circumstances surrounding the defendant’s mental disorders, because no long-form pre-sentence report was conducted, only a short-form. Evidence of the defendant’s juvenile history that included psychiatric treatment in a psychiatric treatment center for children on more than one occasion, and that he suffered from multiple mental disorders, was never introduced despite the court's order for a full presentence report on defendant.
 

23. Defendant sought appellate relief. Trial council withdrew from the case after the November 16, 2004, trial, and new council was appointed to represent defendant on appeal. Appellate relief was denied without an evidentiary hearing. At this time the defendant was provided with a copy of the case file and discovered that there were false felony and misdemeanor convictions listed in the Commonwealth's list of purported list of prior convictions known as "instruction 13-A". Defendant had never seen this list prior to this time. See Appendix 1, A true copy of the Commonwealth's purported list of prior convictions known as instruction 13-A.
 

24. Defendant further sought habeas corpus relief and was also denied without an evidentiary hearing. While in pursuit of habeas corpus relief, defendant contacted Petersburg's Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, as well as Prince George General District Court and Juvenile & Domestic Relations District Court in efforts to get confirmation of the false convictions listed in the Commonwealth's purported list of prior convictions known as instruction 13-A.
 

25. On November 24, 2015, defendant received a response from Prince George General District Court and Juvenile & Domestic Relations District Court confirming that there were no records of defendant having any past or present convictions in that court. See Appendix 2, A true copy of the November 24, 2015, letter from the Prince George General District Court and Juvenile & Domestic Relations District Court.
 

26. Due to defendant’s preexisting inattentive ADHD, anxiety, depression, learning disorders, and dysfunctional working memory, along with the heightened symptoms and developed PTSD resulting from incarceration, the defendant has been unable to effectively bring claims for relief, and thus has not been able to prevail against the existing miscarriage of justice presented in this case as a matter of verdict, sentence, imprisonment, facts, and operation of law. 

Claims I - XV

Claim I, Police Misconduct. Coercion. The detective coerced the defendant to confess. Constitutional Basis

• The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause guarantees that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Together these provisions prohibit the admission of a coerced, involuntary confession in any criminal proceeding. A confession is only admissible if it is the product of a rational intellect and a free will. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960)Governing Standard
• The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), that courts must evaluate the voluntariness of a confession using the totality of the circumstances — examining both the characteristics of the accused and the conduct of law enforcement. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit interrogation methods that overbear the will of the accused. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961). Coercion mandates exclusion even where there is no question about the reliability of the resulting confession.
• A confession obtained through psychological pressure, threats, promises, or deception is constitutionally infirm and must be suppressed. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). Evidence derivative of a coerced confession is likewise inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004). Because Commonwealth's Exhibit-6 — the video confession — was the foundation of the prosecution's entire case in chief, its coerced origin rendered the entire proceeding constitutionally defective.

Argument

• Detective Liverman's interrogation conduct must be evaluated under the totality of circumstances test. The detective's subsequent deliberate deletion of approximately 30 minutes of footage capturing that interrogation is powerful circumstantial evidence of his consciousness of guilt regarding unconstitutional conduct during that interval. The resulting confession cannot be deemed voluntary under Dickerson, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its admission into evidence was reversible error.

Claim II, Police Misconduct. Destruction of evidence. Detective Liverman deleted approximately 30 minutes of footage from the coerced confession recording, known as Commonwealth’s Exhibit-6, to conceal coercion.

Governing Standard

• In California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the government's constitutional duty to preserve evidence arises when: (1) the evidence possesses exculpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed; and (2) the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Where evidence is materially exculpatory under this test, no showing of bad faith is required for a due process violation. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). Where destruction is deliberate, bad faith is established as a matter of law.

Application

• The deleted 30 minutes of footage from Commonwealth's Exhibit-6 is not merely potentially exculpatory — it is materially exculpatory under Trombetta. The defendant specifically alleged that the deleted segment captured the coercive conduct of Detective Liverman. Without that footage, the defendant had no comparable means to demonstrate the coercion that rendered the confession involuntary. Both Trombetta prongs are met.
• Bad faith is additionally established independently: Detective Liverman admitted on the stand that he deleted the footage. This was not accidental loss, equipment failure, or inadvertent erasure. It was deliberate, targeted destruction of a specific segment of footage that captured the detective's own conduct during a custodial interrogation. Courts have consistently held that the deliberate destruction of identified, relevant evidence by police — particularly where the officer knew or should have known of its potential exculpatory value — constitutes bad faith under Youngblood. See also United States v. Holloway, 960 F.2d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (bad faith found where officers deliberately destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence).
• Martin v. State, No. 24-6086 (4th Cir. 2024) — Fourth Circuit granted habeas relief where suppressed evidence contradicted the prosecution's core theory; applied three-part Brady/Strickler materiality test.

Claim III, Prosecutorial Misconduct: The Commonwealth's attorney stated that the missing footage in the video confession known as Commonwealth's exhibit-6 was a mere redaction by the prosecution for the benefit of defendant for trial, when in fact, the redaction of the video confession was the deletion of footage by the detective prior to the video confession ever reaching the Commonwealth's attorney to stand as evidence against the defendant. One can only infer that the Commonwealth's attorney’s actions were deliberate with intent to prevent the video confession from being suppressed. The Commonwealth's case in chief was built on the video confession known as Commonwealth's exhibit-6, as without it the prosecution could not establish a prima facie case. The prosecutor must have known this. Any finder of fact can see said logic especially considering that the first trial ended as a mistrial. Unfortunately, this very act prejudiced the defendant and ultimately deprived him of a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Governing Authority

• In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959), the United States Supreme Court held that a conviction obtained through the knowing use of false evidence violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This principle extends to situations where the State allows a false impression of material fact to go uncorrected: "The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears." The 2025 Supreme Court decision in Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. ___ (2025), reinforced this rule, holding that a prosecutor's allowance of materially false impressions — whether from testimony or representations of counsel — violates due process and mandates relief when material to the conviction.

Application

• The Commonwealth's attorney represented to the court that the missing footage from Exhibit-6 was a prosecution-made redaction for the defendant's benefit at trial. This representation was false. Detective Liverman deleted the footage before the video was ever in the prosecution's possession — a fact the detective himself admitted on the stand. The misrepresentation was material because it: (1) prevented the defense's motion to suppress from being properly evaluated; (2) allowed the altered confession to be played before the jury; and (3) concealed the true chain of custody of the Commonwealth's central piece of evidence.
• Given that the first trial ended in a mistrial, and given that the prosecution's entire case rested on Exhibit-6, the Commonwealth's attorney must have known that suppression of the confession would be fatal to the case. The logical inference — that the misrepresentation was deliberate — is compelled by the record. Under Napue and Glossip, this alone is reversible error.

Claim IV, Prosecutorial Misconduct: Once the defense disclosed its claims of coercion and deleted footage from the video confession confirming said coercion, the prosecution had a moral obligation to protect the fundamental fairness of the trial proceeding. The Commonwealth's attorney must have known that the missing footage from the video confession wherein the defendant alleged coercion took place was imperative to the defense in the same sense as exculpatory evidence/Brady material. However, with reckless disregard, the prosecutor showed the video confession minus the footage that was deleted. Video footage was allowed to be deleted and ignored as though it never existed, when it fact, the record clearly shows that it did, and that not only did it deprive the defendant the right to challenge the admissibility of the video confession during trial based on the constitutional guarantee not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself, it deprived the defendant the right to call upon evidence in defendants favor as guaranteed by the constitution. At the November 16, 2004, trial, the defendant made it clear that "if the whole video could not be played, then none of the video should be played".
Governing Authority

• Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the prosecution has an affirmative, absolute duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that is material to guilt or punishment, regardless of the good or bad faith of the prosecution. This duty encompasses impeachment evidence, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), and extends to information that would support the defense's position even if the prosecution did not formally "possess" it, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have produced a different outcome. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999).

Application

• Once the defendant disclosed his claim of coercion and identified the deleted footage as the evidence confirming it, the footage — and the true circumstances of its deletion — became Brady material. The prosecution had a constitutional obligation to disclose to the defense that the footage was deleted by the detective before the tape was ever turned over to the Commonwealth. Instead, the prosecution presented the altered video as a unilateral "redaction" it had made for the defendant's benefit, suppressing the true story of how the footage disappeared.
• The defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process — and his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process — were directly violated by the prosecution's failure to disclose the true chain of custody. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). The defendant's statement at trial that "if the whole video could not be played, then none of the video should be played" was a direct invocation of that right, which went unprotected.
• Martin v. State, No. 24-6086 (4th Cir. 2024) — Suppressed evidence contradicting prosecution's core theory; Brady materiality; habeas relief granted.

Claim V, Ineffective Assistance of Council. Council failed to challenge indictments as multiplicitous as the two counts of robbery, and the two counts of use of firearm, mounted to a single count of robbery, and a single count of use of firearm arising out of the single robbery. Thus, “significant factual overlap” exists between the charged counts of robbery and the charged counts of use of firearm. This violates the defendant’s protection against double jeopardy.

Governing Standard

• Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a defendant establishes IAC by showing: (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficiency, the outcome would have been different. The Fourth Circuit has reversed Virginia habeas denials where the Supreme Court of Virginia applied the wrong Strickland standard. Wright v. Superintendent (4th Cir. 2021).

The Double Jeopardy / Multiplicity Claim

• The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Virginia Code § 19.2-294 codifies this protection. The governing test is whether each offense requires proof of a fact the other does not. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). Where charges arising from a single act or transaction share "significant factual overlap" — as the two robbery counts and two firearm counts do here, arising from one robbery with one weapon in one location — they are multiplicitous and the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments.
• Virginia Code § 19.2-294 is explicit: conviction under one of two statutes arising from the same act bars prosecution under the other. The two armed robbery counts, the two firearm counts, and the two breaking and entering counts all arose from one continuous criminal episode at one restaurant on one occasion. Counsel's failure to challenge the indictments on multiplicity grounds, and his failure to move for concurrent sentencing on that basis, was objectively unreasonable. Jackson v. Leonardo, 162 F.3d 81, 86–87 (2d Cir. 1998) (failure to raise obvious double jeopardy claim is IAC). Prejudice is self-evident: without the multiplicitous convictions, the defendant faces substantially reduced cumulative punishment.

Claim VI, Ineffective Assistance of Counsil. Counsil failed to challenge the Commonwealth’s attorney’s deliberate misread representation of the facts, alleging that the redaction of the videotaped confession was for the defendant’s benefit, when in fact, it was a ploy to have the video confession played for the jury, despite its prejudice to the defendant. November 16, 2004, trial transcript, page 4, line 24-page 5, line 5.

Argument

• The trial transcript of November 16, 2004 (page 4, line 24 through page 5, line 5) shows that the Commonwealth's attorney misrepresented to the court that the missing footage from Exhibit-6 was a prosecution-made redaction for the defendant's benefit. Defense counsel did not object to, challenge, or correct this misrepresentation. That failure was objectively unreasonable under Strickland.
• A timely objection at this critical moment could have: (1) prompted a judicial inquiry into the true chain of custody of Exhibit-6; (2) led the court to order an examination of when and by whom the footage was deleted; (3) supported a motion to suppress the entirety of Exhibit-6; and (4) exposed the prosecution's false narrative before the jury heard the altered video. Counsel's silence permitted the misrepresentation to stand unchallenged, allowed the altered confession into evidence, and directly prejudiced the defendant's ability to challenge the admissibility of the only evidence the prosecution had.

Claim VII, Prosecutorial Misconduct. The Commonwealth’s attorney deliberately showed the redacted videotaped confession to the jury despite the court’s ruling to leave it out due to its missing part.

Governing Authority

• The deliberate disregard of a trial court's evidentiary ruling is a serious constitutional violation. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to a fair trial, and prosecutorial conduct that intentionally circumvents a court's ruling destroys that guarantee. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). The Supreme Court has recognized that the prosecution's power "carries with it the duty to see that justice is accomplished"; prosecutors who instead exploit courtroom misconduct to gain verdicts betray that duty.
• When the Commonwealth's attorney played the redacted confession after the court had ruled to leave it out, that act constituted a deliberate violation of the court's evidentiary ruling. It placed before the jury evidence that had been excluded by judicial order. It tainted the jury with prejudicial, constitutionally infirm evidence that the court had specifically determined should not be shown. No curative instruction was given. That act alone — the deliberate presentation to the jury of excluded evidence — independently violated the defendant's right to a fair trial under the Due Process Clause.

Claim VIII, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Counsel was ineffective due to his failure to object to and or suppress the showing of the video confession in light of the missing footage and the defendant's claim of coercion. The missing footage was the footage necessary to show the alleged coercion, thus rendering the video confession prejudice to the defense without said deleted footage. With the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in criminal cases, this failure fell below the standard of reasonableness and therefore deprived the defendant of due process.
Argument

• The Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause together prohibit the use of a coerced or involuntary confession. Counsel's failure to seek suppression of Commonwealth's Exhibit-6 — in light of the defendant's coercion claim, the detective's admitted deletion of footage confirming that coercion, and the prosecution's misrepresentation about the deletion — was objectively unreasonable under Strickland.
• Prejudice is established by the prosecution's own position: the Commonwealth built its entire case in chief on Exhibit-6, conceding implicitly that without it, no prima facie case could be made. Had a motion to suppress succeeded — as it should have, given the coercion allegation and the destroyed evidence confirming it — acquittal was the probable result. Counsel's failure to move to suppress, and his failure to object when the prosecution played the video over the court's own ruling, deprived the defendant of the effective assistance the Sixth Amendment guarantees at every critical stage of a criminal proceeding. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001) ("any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance").

Claim IX, Error Upon the Court. The court failed to intervene to protect the fundamental fairness of the trial proceedings when the prosecution played the redacted confession despite the court’s ruling to leave it out, and absent an objection from the defense council. With the trial court having been fully aware of the claim of coercion and a 30-minute deletion of footage confirming coercion, the trial court should have intervened.

Governing Authority

• Trial courts have an independent duty to protect the fundamental fairness of judicial proceedings even absent an objection from defense counsel. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988) ("Courts have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them."). Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), recognized the judiciary's obligation to ensure constitutional safeguards function in practice, not merely in theory.
• At the moment the Commonwealth's attorney played the redacted video in defiance of the court's own ruling, the court was fully aware of: (1) the defendant's claim of coercion; (2) the detective's admission that he deleted the footage; and (3) the prosecution's misrepresentation of the redaction's origin. The court's failure to intervene — sua sponte if necessary — at that juncture permitted a constitutional violation to occur in its presence, on the record, without remedy. This constitutes plain error of constitutional magnitude.

Claim X, Prosecutorial Misconduct: In the preparation of the purported list of prior convictions on the defendant known as "jury instruction 13-A", it's hard to believe that the Commonwealth's attorney, given the volume of her experience, erred with the entry of not one, but several false convictions. Among the false convictions listed was robbery, thus supporting the prosecution's claim of moral turpitude and influencing a verdict favorable to the Commonwealth. The use of false evidence to secure a conviction in a criminal case, either knowingly or unknowingly, is reversible error.
Governing Authority

• In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959), the Supreme Court held that the use of false evidence — including false documentary evidence — to secure a conviction violates the Due Process Clause regardless of the prosecution's subjective intent. "A State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction." This principle was reaffirmed in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and most recently in Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. ___ (2025), which held that the prosecution must correct any false evidence it has presented, and failure to do so mandates reversal.

Application

• Jury Instruction 13-A, prepared by the Commonwealth and presented to the jury as the defendant's list of prior convictions, contained multiple false entries, including a false robbery conviction. This false conviction was not incidental. It was directly material: it portrayed the defendant as a career robber — precisely the character the prosecution needed the jury to attribute to him — and it infected the jury's assessment of both guilt and punishment.
• The Commonwealth's attorney, given her experience and the straightforward process of verifying prior conviction records, either knew or should have known that the entries were false. Under Napue and Glossip, both knowing use and reckless presentation of false conviction records violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Where, as here, false prior convictions are used to establish moral turpitude and support the prosecution's theory of the case, the error is reversible as a matter of law.

Claim XI, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Counsel was ineffective due to his failure to confirm the purported convictions listed in the Commonwealth's list of prior convictions known as instruction 13-A. This failure fell below the standard of reasonableness and deprived the defendant of adequate defense. Had counsel confirmed all convictions he would have known to object to or move to suppress the false entries.
Argument

• Defense counsel's failure to verify the accuracy of every entry in Jury Instruction 13-A before it was presented to the jury was objectively unreasonable under Strickland. Verification of a prior conviction list is not a complex legal task — it requires only the basic professional diligence of cross-referencing the listed convictions against publicly available court records. This is a fundamental, non-discretionary professional obligation. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice confirm that defense counsel must investigate and review all evidence the prosecution intends to use, including documentary evidence bearing on the defendant's credibility and character.
• Had counsel verified the entries, he would have discovered the false robbery conviction and moved to suppress or correct Instruction 13-A before it reached the jury. Prejudice is direct: the jury deliberated on guilt and punishment while believing the defendant had a prior robbery conviction he did not have. That false belief, introduced through counsel's inaction, had a "substantial and injurious effect" on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).

Claim XII, Error Upon the Court. The trial court error to overrule the defense council’s motion to strike the Commonwealth’s case. At this point, the prosecution had unlawfully played the redacted confession, Detective Liverman had admitted on the stand that he deleted the missing footage from the confession, and the fairness of the trial was tainted. Yet the trial court abused its discretion and deprived the defendant of a fair trial despite evident constitutional violations on record.

Argument

• By the time the defense moved to strike the Commonwealth's case, three independent, unremediated constitutional violations had occurred on the record before the same judge: (1) the coerced confession admitted without suppression; (2) the detective's on-the-stand admission that he deleted exculpatory footage; and (3) the prosecution's deliberate playing of the excluded video over the court's own ruling. The trial court's denial of the motion to strike at that stage was an abuse of discretion and constitutionally untenable.
• Virginia law recognizes that the trial court may strike the prosecution's evidence as insufficient at the close of the Commonwealth's case. Where the only admitted evidence is a confession that should have been suppressed — or that was admitted only through a series of constitutional violations — granting the motion to strike is not merely proper but constitutionally required. The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process encompasses the right to have a conviction rest on constitutionally obtained and properly admitted evidence. The trial court's refusal to strike, on this record, deprived the defendant of that guarantee.

Claim XIII, Denial of Right to Present a Complete Defense. Defendant was barred from showing coercive footage and/or confronting how the confession was obtained. The defense was based on the involuntary confession due to coercion, and destruction of exculpatory evidence (coerced confession footage). Also, that a partial, redacted confession shown to the jury after coercive tactics is constitutionally infirm and undermines the jury’s ability to assess voluntariness in violation of rules of evidence.

Governing Authority

• The Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause guarantee a criminal defendant the right to present a complete defense. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) ("the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense"). The right is violated when the defendant is prevented from presenting evidence central to the defense theory.
• The defendant's entire defense rested on the involuntariness of the confession due to coercion. The deleted footage was the only evidence that could demonstrate that coercion. By allowing the prosecution to present a partial, redacted confession — stripped of the footage showing coercive conduct — while denying the defendant any means to show what had been deleted or to challenge the admissibility of the remaining footage, the trial proceedings deprived the defendant of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. The defendant was effectively forced to be a witness against himself — through a confession he alleged was coerced — with no ability to show the jury or the court the circumstances under which that confession was obtained.
• The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause guarantees the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses on matters bearing on their credibility. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974). The inability to confront Detective Liverman with the complete video of the interrogation — because he destroyed the relevant portion — directly impaired this constitutional right. A partial, redacted confession, shown to the jury after coercive tactics and absent the footage confirming those tactics, is constitutionally infirm and undermines the jury's ability to assess voluntariness.

Claim XIV, Prosecutorial Misconduct. Uncorrected false impression left by state through instruction 13-A. commonwealth attorney knew or should have known some of the prior convictions listed were false and failed to correct them. 

Governing Authority

• The Supreme Court in Napue v. Illinois and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), established that a prosecutor's duty to correct false evidence applies continuously throughout trial. A prosecutor who presents false evidence and then remains silent while the jury deliberates on that false evidence — without correction — commits an ongoing due process violation. Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. ___ (2025), makes clear this duty is non-delegable and failure to correct is reversible error when the false evidence is material to the conviction.

Application

• The Commonwealth's attorney knew, or should have known, that Jury Instruction 13-A contained false conviction entries. The false robbery conviction entry was the single most damaging individual entry in that list — it directly supported the prosecution's narrative of moral turpitude and corroborated the very charge the defendant was facing. Whether the false entries resulted from carelessness or deliberate inclusion, the prosecution's failure to correct them before the jury deliberated constituted a continuous due process violation under Napue, Giglio, and Glossip. The false conviction records were material — without them, the jury's assessment of the defendant's character and prior conduct would have been materially different. Reversal is the constitutionally required remedy.

Claim XV, Unconstitutional Convictions and Imprisonment: In light of the facts and circumstances on the face of the record highlighted in claims I through XII, the defendant's convictions in cases CR04-558-01 through CR04-563-01 are contrary to the constitution, therefore, are unconstitutional and invalid. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law". However, the defendant was deprived of due process and thus renders the defendant's convictions and imprisonment unconstitutional.

The Fourteenth Amendment Guarantee

• The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The convictions in Cases CR04-558-01 through CR04-563-01 were obtained in direct violation of this guarantee.

Cumulative Constitutional Error

• Even where individual constitutional errors might not each independently mandate reversal, the cumulative effect of multiple constitutional violations compels relief. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). The doctrine of cumulative error recognizes that a trial infected by multiple constitutional violations — each reinforcing and amplifying the others — cannot produce a verdict that comports with due process. The Fourth Circuit applies this principle in habeas proceedings.
• The convictions here rest on the following cumulative constitutional foundations — each constitutionally infirm: